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Abstract
We study the implications of procedural fairness on income taxation. All taxation
schemes are allowed for, up to the constraints implied by incentive compatibility and
budget balance. We formulate procedural fairness as a particular non-cooperative
bargaining game and examine the stationary subgame perfect equilibria of the game.
The equilibrium outcome is called tax equilibrium and is shown to be unique. Pro-
cedurally fair taxation schemes are defined as the taxation schemes that result in the
limit of tax equilibria when the probability that negotiations break down converges
to zero. The procedurally fair taxation scheme is shown to be unique. It is shown to
correspond to the taxation scheme resulting from the Nash bargaining solution and
leads to full redistribution of income.
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1 Introduction
Modern societies redistribute large amounts of income by means of income taxation in an
attempt to improve upon the fairness of the income distribution. In the theory of income
taxation it is standard practise to view the problem of choosing a taxation scheme as
an optimization problem by a social planner as is for instance the case in the landmark
contribution by Mirrlees (1971) and many of his followers. A problematic part of this
approach is that there is no reason to favor one social welfare function over another. In
general, few attempts have been made to justify the particular social welfare function
chosen, a notable exception being Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2006), who base the social
welfare function on the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle.
Cooperative game theory has taken a different approach. The problem of fair income
taxation is frequently studied, though it is usually formulated as a bankruptcy problem.
The typical approach there is to specify axioms that a taxation scheme should satisfy
and to show that the axioms pin down a unique solution. Many taxation schemes can be
justified by the axiomatic approach. Well-known rules that have been axiomatized are the
proportional, adjusted proportional, constrained equal awards, constrained equal losses,
Piniles’, egalitarian, constrained egalitarian, and the random arrival rule. For a survey of
this approach we refer the reader to Thomson (2003). Incentive issues, central to the work
of Mirrlees (1971), are typically ignored in the cooperative approach.
In this paper we analyze procedural fairness rather than fairness, and use non-cooperative
game theory to analyze the taxation schemes that result from using a fair procedure to
decide upon income taxation. Procedures are considered fair if they create equal chances
for persons involved in the procedure. It is equal opportunities that matters rather than an
equal allocation that results. This approach allows use to analyze fair choice without the
ad hoc imposition of a social welfare function. At the same time we can easily deal with
incentive issues, as our approach benefits from the full flexibility offered by non-cooperative
game theoretic modeling.
The fair procedure that we consider is called the unanimous approval procedure. In
the unanimous approval procedure, all citizens in society have an equal chance of making
a proposal. A proposal is only carried out if it is approved of by all citizens. If one of
the citizens rejects, there is some probability that the procedure breaks down. With the
remaining probability, the continuation probability, a new proposer is selected at random
from the pool of all citizens, and so on, and so forth.
We propose the unanimous approval procedure as a normative concept. Since people
tend to object strongly to procedures that are not deemed fair (Bolton, Brandts, and
Ockenfels, 2005), it may have value as a positive concept too. The unanimous approval
procedure resembles an ideal direct democracy where every citizen has equal rights in
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making and rejecting proposals. Although ideal direct democracies do not exist, many
democratic procedures have the intention to approximate such an ideal situation.
The unanimous approval procedure is an extension of the alternating offers procedure
introduced in Rubinstein (1982) to the situation with an arbitrary number of citizens.
Contrary to Rubinstein (1982), citizens do not alternate or rotate in making offers, but
are selected randomly in each bargaining round, as in Binmore (1987). The unanimous
approval procedure is also a special case of the bargaining models of collective choice as
considered in Banks and Duggan (2000), where the recognition probabilities are restricted
to be uniform and approval by a coalition within a set of decisive coalitions is replaced by
unanimous approval. Banks and Duggan (2000) study such models as positive rather than
normative concepts.
The study of procedural fairness in income taxation was initiated in Herings and
Predtetchinski (2011b). In that paper it was assumed that taxation schemes have to
be linear and the problem studied was therefore the determination of the procedurally fair
tax rate. The paper shows that the procedurally fair tax rate is unique. It also provides a
general characterization of the procedurally fair tax rate. Next this characterization is used
to demonstrate that in societies populated by citizens with constant relative risk aversion,
as well as in sufficiently heterogeneous societies, the procedurally fair tax rate is equal to
the probability mass of below average income citizens.
In this paper we de not make any assumptions on taxation schemes, beyond the ones
imposed by incentive compatibility. Societies are populated by citizens with different pro-
ductivity levels. Citizens do not derive disutility from labor. Incentive compatibility then
requires that after-tax income be increasing in pre-tax income. Taxation is used for redis-
tributive purposes only, so the second constraint on feasible taxation schemes comes from a
balanced budget requirement. Citizens are free to propose any taxation scheme satisfying
these two constraints. In particular, they may propose a complete redistribution of in-
come, the egalitarian solution, they may propose laissez-faire, and they may even propose
to tax the poor and subsidize the rich. Since taxation schemes are general up to the two
constraints, we can also address whether procedurally fair taxation leads to progressive
income taxation, an issue taken up in Roemer (1999) and a large subsequent literature.
A tax equilibrium is a tuple of proposals, one for each citizen, with the property that all
proposals are accepted by all citizens. Moreover, the proposal of a citizen is the one giving
him the highest income among all proposals that are accepted by all citizens. We argue
that tax equilibria are in a one-to-one correspondence with subgame perfect equilibria
in stationary strategies of the extensive form game implied by the unanimous approval
procedure.
In the presence of incentive compatibility constraints, a complete redistribution of in-
2
come is the most extreme egalitarian proposal that is feasible. The most extreme proposal
in the other direction is to fully tax the income of all citizens except the most productive
one, and transfer it to the citizen with highest productivity. Although this proposal is
feasible, it will not be proposed by any citizen, not even the one with the highest pro-
ductivity, since it is surely rejected by the other citizens. A proposal involving complete
redistribution will also not be proposed by the citizen with the highest productivity. In-
centive compatibility implies that this citizen receives at least the average income in all
proposals, and strictly more if he is proposing himself.
Consider a tax equilibrium proposal by a particular citizen. All citizens with lower
productivity are taxed up to the reservation income derived from their tax equilibrium
utility. To avoid rejection by more productive citizens, also those have to be promised at
least their reservation income. Incentive compatibility of the taxation scheme may force
the citizen to make a proposal strictly above their reservation income. In general, the
tax equilibrium proposal is such that all citizens with higher productivity up to some
productivity level are proposed the same after-tax income as the proposer, and citizens
with even higher productivity their reservation income.
In general multi-lateral bargaining models with unanimous agreement, little is known
about conditions under which equilibria are unique. The most general results are derived
by Merlo and Wilson (1995). However, the incentive compatibility constraints on taxa-
tion schemes make that their assumptions on the set of feasible alternatives are violated.
Nevertheless, we can show that tax equilibria are unique.
Consider a sequence of continuation probabilities converging to one and consider the
corresponding sequence of tax equilibria. It follows from a standard argument that all
citizens make the same proposal in the limit. Taxation schemes are said to be procedurally
fair if they correspond to such a limit proposal. We are interested in the uniqueness and
the characterization of procedurally fair taxation schemes.
The literature on multi-lateral bargaining with unanimous agreement has shown con-
vergence of bargaining equilibrium proposals to the Nash bargaining solution (Hart and
Mas-Colell (1996), Laruelle and Valenciano (2007), Miyakawa (2008), Kultti and Vartiainen
(2010), and Britz, Herings and Predtetchinski (2010)). Unfortunately, all these papers need
differentiability assumptions with respect to the set of feasible alternatives, an assumption
that is clearly violated for the set of feasible taxation schemes. Moreover, Kultti and
Vartiainen (2010) and Herings and Predtetchinski (2011a) present examples where in the
absence of differentiability assumptions, sequences of bargaining equilibria may have a limit
different from the Nash bargaining solution and may have multiple limits.
For the cases with two or three citizens it is possible to calculate tax equilibria ex-
plicitly and verify uniqueness of the procedurally fair taxation scheme. For these cases, it
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corresponds to the egalitarian outcome, although for the three-citizen case this outcome
is not proposed by any citizen for sufficiently high values of the continuation probability,
but is only reached in the limit. The egalitarian outcome, or equivalently, complete redis-
tribution, is also the outcome predicted by an application of the Nash bargaining solution
to our tax problem. We demonstrate that also in the n-player case, the procedurally fair
taxation scheme is unique and leads to the egalitarian outcome.
Our results demonstrate a striking difference between the case where taxation schemes
are required to be linear as studied in Herings and Predtetchinski (2011b) versus the case
where the taxation scheme is fully flexible, up to incentive compatibility constraints. In
the former case, a procedurally fair tax rate strictly less than one results and, under some
additional conditions, the procedurally fair tax rate is equal to the probability mass of
below average income citizens. Full flexibility of taxation schemes leads to a procedurally
fair taxation scheme corresponding to full redistribution. Below average income citizens
can apparently exploit the flexibility of taxation schemes to increase the amount of redis-
tribution in society.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the unanimous approval proce-
dure and Section 3 the notion of tax equilibrium. Section 4 characterizes optimal proposals
of citizens and Section 5 demonstrates the uniqueness of tax equilibria. Section 6 com-
putes the tax equilibrium explicitly for two simple examples and shows that it converges
to complete redistribution in the limit when the continuation probability converges to one.
Procedurally fair taxation schemes are introduced in Section 7 and they are shown to be
unique and equal to the taxation scheme corresponding to the Nash bargaining solution in
Section 8. Section 9 concludes.
2 The Unanimous Approval Procedure
We study procedurally fair taxation in a society with a finite population of citizens N =
{1, . . . , n}. A citizen i ∈ N has a productivity level of wi ≥ 0, can work up to one unit of
time, and derives no disutility from labor. Citizen i therefore has a pre-tax income of wi.
We assume that wi < wi′ if i < i
′. The after-tax income of citizen i is denoted xi. We write
w = (w1, . . . , wn) and x = (x1, . . . , xn).
For a group of citizens G ⊂ N and a vector y ∈ Rn, we use the notation y(G) = ∑i∈G yi.
A group of citizens G of the form {i, i+ 1, . . . , j − 1, j} for some i, j ∈ N, is denoted [i, j].
Without loss of generality we normalize aggregate pre-tax income w(N) to be equal to
1. It follows that wi corresponds to the share of aggregate pre-tax income that is generated
by citizen i.
We are interested in the case where taxation schemes are general up to two constraints.
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The first constraint comes from incentive compatibility considerations. After-tax income
should be increasing in pre-tax income, so xi ≤ xi′ if i ≤ i′. The second constraint is a
balanced budget requirement. We assume that taxation is used for redistribution purposes
only, so aggregate after-tax income x(N) should be equal to aggregate pre-tax income
w(N).
The set X of feasible after-tax incomes is therefore equal to
X = {x ∈ Rn+ | xi ≤ xi′ if i ≤ i′, x(N) = 1}.
Two possible taxation schemes are complete redistribution and laissez-faire. Complete
redistribution amounts to xi = 1/n for all citizens i. In the case of laissez-faire it holds that
xi = wi for all citizens i. Complete redistribution is the most egalitarian feasible taxation
scheme. The least egalitarian feasible taxation scheme specifies xi = 0 for i ∈ [1, n − 1]
and xn = 1, and redistributes all income to the highest-income citizen.
Procedural fairness embodies equal opportunities for all citizens involved in the pro-
cedure. When applied to income taxation, we model procedural fairness as a process in
which all citizens have an equal opportunity to make a proposal, and where a proposal
has to be approved of by all citizens in order to be implemented. These principles lead to
the unanimous approval procedure as introduced in Herings and Predtetchinski (2011b),
where attention is restricted to the case of linear taxation schemes.
The unanimous approval procedure is defined as follows. In each bargaining round r,
each citizen has an equal chance to be selected as the proposer. The selected citizen, say
citizen i, makes a proposal pi ∈ X. After observing pi, citizens sequentially decide whether
to accept or to reject the proposal in a fixed a priorily chosen order. If all citizens accept,
then after-tax incomes are given by pi, leading to utility pij for citizen j ∈ N. As soon as
some citizen rejects, the procedure breaks down with probability 1− δ > 0 and continues
with probability δ ≥ 0 in bargaining round r+ 1 with the selection of a randomly selected
citizen as the proposer. If no agreement is ever reached, all citizens receive utility 0.
We analyze subgame perfect equilibria in stationary strategies (SSPE) of the game in-
duced by the unanimous approval procedure. A stationary strategy of citizen i, σi =
(pi, Ai), consists of a proposal pi ∈ X and an acceptance set Ai ⊂ X. The acceptance
set consists of those proposals that are accepted by a citizen. This specification results
in a stationary strategy because pi and Ai are time and history independent. We write
p = (p1, . . . , pn) and A = (A1, . . . , An). The social acceptance set consists of the proposals
that are accepted by all citizens and is given by ∩i∈NAi. A strategy profile (p,A) is a
subgame perfect equilibrium if it induces a Nash equilibrium in every subgame.
A strategy profile σ = (σi)i∈N determines the expected utility U i(σ) for each citizen i
as evaluated at the beginning of the game. This utility is equal to the expected value of
after-tax income. Since strategies are stationary, U i(σ) is also the continuation utility of
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citizen i, the expected utility as evaluated at the beginning of any bargaining round r, and
therefore equal to the expected after-tax income at the beginning of any bargaining round
r.
A strategy profile (p,A) is called a no-delay strategy profile if pi ∈ ∩j∈NAj for all i ∈ N.
3 Tax Equilibrium
The concept of SSPE imposes relatively few restrictions on individual acceptance sets. For
instance, it may well happen at equilibrium that a citizen accepts a proposal which is very
unfavorable to him in the knowledge that it will be rejected by a citizen that responds next.
To avoid such inessential multiplicity we next introduce a more basic notion of equilibrium,
called tax equilibrium, which is shown to be essentially equivalent to the notion of SSPE.
Definition 3.1: The profile p ∈ XN is a tax equilibrium if pi ∈ arg maxx∈S xi, for all
i ∈ N, where S = {x ∈ X | x ≥ δ∑j∈N(1/n)pj}.
We associate to a tax equilibrium p the strategy profile σ = (p,A(p)), where
Ai(p) = {x ∈ X | xi ≥ δ
∑
j∈N
(1/n)pji}, i ∈ N.
Notice that at a tax equilibrium, every citizen i makes a proposal pi in the social acceptance
set ∩j∈NAj(p) = {x ∈ X | x ≥ δ
∑
j∈N(1/n)p
j}, which coincides with the set S as defined
in Definition 3.1. The strategy profile (p,A(p)) therefore satisfies the no-delay property.
Observe that
∑
j∈N(1/n)p
j is equal to the expected utility in a tax equilibrium. According
to the individual acceptance set Ai(p), a citizen accepts any proposal that leads to after-
tax income greater than or equal to tax equilibrium utility multiplied by δ. Conditional on
being the proposer, every citizen makes a proposal that maximizes his income among all
the proposals in the social acceptance set. Since all the proposals pj belong to X, and X is
convex, it also holds that
∑
j∈N(1/n)p
j belongs to X. Equilibrium utility is non-negative
and citizens with higher pre-tax income have higher expected tax equilibrium utility.
Before turning to the existence and uniqueness of tax equilibria in Section 5, we argue
first that tax equilibrium is an appropriate concept in the sense that if p is a tax equilib-
rium, then (p,A(p)) is an SSPE.
Theorem 3.2: If p ∈ XN is a tax equilibrium, then (p,A(p)) is an SSPE.
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Proof: A one–shot deviation in a subgame is a single deviation by the player at the
root of the subgame. It holds that (p,A(p)) is an SSPE if and only if there is no player
having a profitable one–shot deviation. The proof of this fact is standard in the literature
and is based on the optimality principle from dynamic programming.
Let p be a tax equilibrium. We demonstrate next that no player has a profitable one–
shot deviation from (p,A(p)). We denote the tax equilibrium utility by y =
∑
j∈N(1/n)p
j.
Consider a subgame starting at a history where citizen i is the proposer, so according
to (p,A(p)) the proposal pi is made by i and next accepted by all players, giving rise to
subgame utility pii for citizen i. Consider a one–shot deviation by citizen i to a proposal
x ∈ X. If x does not belong to ∩j∈NAj(p), it leads to subgame utility δyi for player i.
Since δyi ≤ pii by definition of pi, such a deviation is not profitable. If x does belong
to ∩j∈NAj(p), it holds that xi ≤ pii by definition of pi, and again the deviation is not
profitable.
Consider a subgame starting at a history where citizen i is the responder to a proposal
x ∈ X. If xj ≥ δyj for all j ∈ N such that either j = i or j responds after citizen i, then
x is accepted, giving subgame utility xi to citizen i. A one–shot deviation by citizen i to
rejection leads to subgame utility δyi ≤ xi and is therefore not profitable. If xi < δyi and
xj ≥ δyj for all j ∈ N such that j responds after citizen i, then x is rejected and citizen
i’s subgame utility is equal to δyi. A one–shot deviation by citizen i to acceptance leads to
subgame utility xi < δyi and is therefore not profitable. If xj < δyj for some j ∈ N such
that j responds after citizen i, then x is rejected and citizen i’s subgame utility is equal
to δyi, irrespective of citizen i’s decision, so one–shot deviations are not profitable. Q.E.D.
Next we argue the converse of Theorem 3.2 to be true. If (p,A) is an SSPE, where A
may or may not be equal to A(p), then p is a tax equilibrium.
Theorem 3.3: If (p,A) is an SSPE, then (p,A) is a no–delay strategy profile, and p
is a tax equilibrium.
Proof: Let (p,A) be an SSPE. We denote the SSPE utility by y. The proof proceeds
in five steps.
(1) {x ∈ X | x δy} ⊂ ∩j∈NAj.1
Suppose there is x ∈ X such that x δy, but x /∈ ∩j∈NAj. Let player i be such that x /∈ Ai
and for all players j responding after player i it holds that x ∈ Aj. Consider a subgame
1We use the notation to indicate that all components of a first vector strictly exceed the corresponding
components of a second vector, whereas > is used to mean that this property holds for at least one
component.
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starting at a history where citizen i has to respond to proposal x. The subgame equilibrium
utility of player i is equal to δyi. A one–shot deviation by citizen i to acceptance leads to
subgame utility xi > δyi and is therefore profitable, a contradiction.
(2) For all i ∈ N, pi ∈ ∩j∈NAj.
Suppose by way of contradiction that there is i ∈ N such that pi /∈ ∩j∈NAj. Consider the
subgame starting at a history where citizen i is the proposer. Since pi is rejected, there is a
positive probability that all players receive after–tax income 0, so
∑
j∈N yj < 1. Moreover,
since y is a weighted average of vectors in X and the zero vector, it holds that yj ≤ yk if
j < k. It follows that there is x ∈ X such that x  y. The subgame equilibrium utility
of player i is equal to δyi. Consider the one–shot deviation of player i where he proposes
x. By (1) the proposal x is accepted, leading to subgame utility xi > δyi for citizen i. We
have found a profitable one–shot deviation, a contradiction to (p,A) being an SSPE. We
have as a consequence that y =
∑
j∈N(1/n)p
j.
(3) For all i ∈ N, pi ∈ arg maxx∈∩j∈NAj xi.
Clearly, the availability of a proposal that gives citizen i a strictly higher utility than pi
and that is accepted by all citizens leads to a profitable deviation in a subgame starting at
a history where citizen i is the proposer.
(4) ∩j∈NAj ⊂ S = {x ∈ X | x ≥ δy}.
Suppose not. Let x ∈ ∩j∈NAj and i ∈ N be such that xi < δyi and xj ≥ δyj for all j ∈ N
responding after i. Consider the subgame starting at a history where citizen i responds
to the proposal x. Since x is accepted by i and all his followers, the subgame equilibrium
utility of citizen i is xi. A one–shot deviation by player i to rejection leads to subgame
utility δyi > xi, and is therefore profitable, a contradiction.
(5) For all i ∈ N, pi ∈ arg maxx∈S xi.
By (2) and (4), for all i ∈ N, pi ∈ ∩j∈NAj ⊂ S, so pii ≤ maxx∈S xi. Suppose there is i ∈ N
and x¯ ∈ S such that x¯i > pii. The vector y¯ ∈ RN defined by y¯j = δyj + (1 − δ)/n, j ∈ N,
satisfies y¯ ∈ S and y¯  δy. Let z¯ be a strictly convex combination of x¯ and y¯, so z¯ ∈ S
and z¯  δy. For a sufficiently small weight on y¯ it holds that z¯i > pii. By (1) it holds
that z¯ ∈ ∩j∈NAj. We obtain a contradiction to pi being a vector in ∩j∈NAj with maximal
component i. Q.E.D.
It follows from Theorem 3.2 and 3.3 that there is no loss of generality to restrict
attention to tax equilibria when analyzing the consequences of procedurally fair income
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taxation.
4 Optimal Proposals
In this section we characterize the solution to citizen i’s optimization problem of choosing
the best proposal within the set of socially acceptable proposals. Given a vector y ∈ X of
equilibrium utilities, citizen i’s optimization problem is
maximize xi
subject to x ∈ X,
x ≥ δy.
A solution to this problem is denoted ai(y) ∈ X and yields the proposed after-tax income
by citizen i given tax equilibrium utility y. In this section we argue this solution to be
unique.
The set {x ∈ X | x ≥ δy} is compact. We claim that x¯ ∈ Rn defined by x¯j = δyj,
j ∈ [1, n − 1], and x¯n = 1 −
∑
j∈[1,n−1] δyj belongs to X, so X is non-empty. Indeed, it
holds that x¯(N) = 1, for every j ∈ [1, n− 2] it holds that x¯j = δyj ≤ δyj+1 = x¯j+1, and
x¯n = 1−
∑
j∈[1,n−1]
δyj > δyn ≥ δyn−1 = x¯n−1.
The problem of citizen i therefore involves the maximization of a continuous function on a
non-empty compact set and therefore has at least one solution. The following proposition
is straightforward to verify and is stated without proof.
Proposition 4.1: Let ai(y) be a solution to the optimization problem of citizen i ∈ N
when tax equilibrium utility is y ∈ X. Then there exists a threshold ki ∈ [i, n] such that
aij(y) =

δy([i,ki])+1−δ
ki−i+1 , j ∈ [i, ki],
δyj, j ∈ N \ [i, ki],
and
δyki ≤ aiki(y) < δyki+1.
In an optimal proposal by citizen i, all citizens in [i, ki] receive the same after-tax
income, equal to aii(y).
Consider some y ∈ X and i ∈ N. We define the function gi : [i, n]→ R by
gi(k) =
δy([i, k]) + 1− δ
k − i+ 1 .
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Then gi(k) is equal to the after-tax income of citizen i when the citizens j ∈ N \ [i, k] are
given after-tax income δyj and the remainder of aggregate pre-tax income is shared equally
between the citizens in [i, k]. We define the set
Ki = {k ∈ [i, n] | δyk ≤ gi(k) < δyk+1} .
From Proposition 4.1 we know that aii(y) = gi(k) for some k ∈ Ki. As Proposition 4.2
below shows, the set Ki is a singleton. Therefore, the threshold ki can be characterized as
the unique integer k ∈ [i, n] satisfying the inequality δyk ≤ gi(k) < δyk+1.
Proposition 4.2: Consider some y ∈ X and i ∈ N. The set Ki is a singleton.
Proof: Some elementary algebra shows that for k ∈ [i+ 1, n],
gi(k)− gi(k − 1) = δyk − gi(k)
k − i ,
so
gi(k) ≥ gi(k − 1) if and only if δyk ≥ gi(k). (4.1)
We show next that Ki is an interval. Assume that j and k are elements of Ki with j < k.
We prove that the set Ki contains the entire interval [j, k]. It holds that
δyk−1 ≤ δyk ≤ gi(k) ≤ gi(k − 1),
where the first inequality follows from y ∈ X, the second inequality follows since k ∈ Ki,
and the third inequality follows from the second inequality and Equation 4.1. Iterating
this argument, we obtain the chain of inequalities
δyj ≤ · · · ≤ δyk ≤ gi(k) ≤ · · · ≤ gi(j). (4.2)
At the same time, we obtain the chain of inequalities
gi(k) ≤ · · · ≤ gi(j) < δyj+1 ≤ · · · ≤ δyk+1, (4.3)
where the first tuple of weak inequalities follows from (4.2), the strict inequality since
j ∈ Ki, and the last tuple of weak inequalities from y ∈ X. The inequalities in (4.2) and
(4.3) show that [j, k] is contained in Ki.
Finally, suppose that both k− 1 and k belong to the set Ki. Then δyk−1 ≤ gi(k− 1) <
δyk ≤ gi(k) < δyk+1, thus in particular gi(k − 1) < gi(k). But this is in contradiction to
Inequality 4.1 since gi(k) ≥ δyk implies that gi(k − 1) ≥ gi(k). This proves that Ki is a
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singleton. Q.E.D.
Combining Proposition 4.1 and 4.2 leads to the following result.
Corollary 4.3: The solution ai(y) to the optimization problem of citizen i ∈ N is
unique for every y ∈ X.
Proposition 4.4: For every citizen i ∈ N, the function ai : X → X is continuous.
Proof: The correspondence ϕ : X → X defined by
ϕ(y) = {x ∈ X | x ≥ δy}, y ∈ X,
is compact-valued and has a closed graph, so is upper hemi-continuous. To show it is lower
hemi-continuous, consider y¯ ∈ X, a sequence (ym)m∈N in X converging to y¯, and x¯ ∈ ϕ(y¯).
We have to construct a sequence (xm)m∈N in X such that xm ∈ ϕ(ym) for all m ∈ N, and
xm → x¯. We define
xm = δym + αm max{x¯− δym, 0},
where
αm =
1− δ∑
j∈N max{x¯j − δym,j, 0}
and max{x¯−δym, 0} denotes the vector obtained by taking the component-wise maximum.
The denominator in the expression for αm is well-defined since∑
j∈N
max{x¯j − δym,j, 0} ≥
∑
j∈N
(x¯j − δym,j) = 1− δ,
so αm ∈ (0, 1].
We show next that for all m ∈ N it holds that xm ∈ ϕ(ym). Clearly it holds that
xm(N) = 1 and xm ≥ δym. Consider some i ∈ [1, n− 1]. If x¯i ≤ δym,i, then xm,i = δym,i ≤
δym,i+1 ≤ xm,i+1. Consider the case where x¯i > δym,i, so xm,i = αmx¯i + (1 − αm)δym,i. If
x¯i+1 ≤ δym,i+1, then
xm,i+1 = δym,i+1 ≥ x¯i+1 ≥ x¯i > αmx¯i + (1− αm)δym,i = xm,i.
If x¯i+1 > δym,i+1, then
xm,i+1 = αmx¯i+1 + (1− αm)δym,i+1 ≥ αmx¯i + (1− αm)δym,i = xm,i.
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Since ym → y¯, we have that
αm =
1− δ∑
j∈N max{x¯j − δym,j, 0}
→ 1− δ∑
j∈N max{x¯j − δy¯j, 0}
=
1− δ∑
j∈N(x¯j − δy¯j)
= 1,
so
xm → δy¯ + max{x¯− δy¯, 0} = δy¯ + x¯− δy¯ = x¯.
We have shown that ϕ is lower hemi-continuous.
The function f : X → R defined by f(x) = xi is continuous. An application of the
maximum theorem yields that the correspondence µ : X → X defined by
µ(y) = {x¯ ∈ ϕ(y) | ∀x ∈ ϕ(y), f(x) ≤ f(x¯)}, y ∈ X,
is upper hemi-continuous. Since µ(y) = {ai(y)} for all y ∈ X, it follows that ai is a
continuous function. Q.E.D.
5 Uniqueness of the Tax Equilibrium
Very little is known about the uniqueness of SSPE in multi-lateral bargaining models
with unanimous agreement. It follows from the results in Kalandrakis (2006) that the
most one can hope for is that the number of equilibria is odd for generic specifications
of the model. Under more special assumptions it is possible to obtain uniqueness results,
as is the case in Merlo and Wilson (1995). There it is assumed that the set of feasible
utilities is generated by the division of a physical cake C = {c ∈ Rn+ |
∑n
i=1 ci ≤ 1},
with player i deriving utility ui(ci) from a share ci, where u
i(0) = 0.2 For the model with
random proposers, as studied in this paper, Merlo and Wilson (1995) show that equilibria
are unique when the utility functions are all linear. For the model with deterministic
proposers, it is sufficient that the utility functions are concave. They also provide a more
abstract uniqueness result. However, our set X does not lead to continuous functions ξi as
required in their Assumption (A1), neither can it be derived from an underlying physical
cake as required in their Assumption (A2) because of our requirement that xi ≤ xi+1 for
x ∈ X. Other uniqueness results are given in Imai and Salonen (2000), Cho and Duggan
(2003), and Cardona and Ponsat´ı (2007) for the case where the physical cake C is a
unit interval. Imai and Salonen (2000) study the case where utility functions are either
monotonically increasing or monotonically decreasing on the unit interval. Cho and Duggan
(2003) prove uniqueness for quadratic utility functions, and show that uniqueness does not
2The Merlo and Wilson (1995) set-up allows the size of the physical cake C to be state-dependent,
rather than being fixed to 1.
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hold for general concave utility functions. It follows from Cardona and Ponsat´ı (2007) that
concavity together with symmetry around the peak is sufficient for uniqueness. Obviously,
none of these results implies uniqueness in our setting since the multi-dimensional set X
cannot be generated from a 1-dimensional physical cake C by utility functions satisfying
the assumptions of the various uniqueness results.
In this section, we demonstrate that the tax equilibrium is unique by establishing that
the function f : X → X defined by
f(y) =
n∑
i=1
1
n
ai(y), y ∈ X,
is a contraction with contraction coefficient δ, i.e. for all y, y¯ ∈ X it holds that ‖f(y) −
f(y¯)‖ ≤ δ‖y − y¯‖, where ‖ · ‖ denotes the infinity norm. It follows directly from the
definition of a tax equilibrium that y ∈ X is the tax equilibrium utility if and only if y
is a fixed point of f. In this case ai(y) is the equilibrium proposal for after-tax income by
citizen i ∈ N.
Consider a citizen i ∈ N. We use the notation ki(y) for the unique threshold as defined
in Proposition 4.1, so we make the dependence on y ∈ X explicit. For k ∈ [i, n] we define
X ik = {y ∈ X | ki(y) = k}. On the set X ik, the function ai is given by
aij(y) =
{
δy([i,k])+1−δ
k−i+1 , j ∈ [i, k],
δyj, j ∈ N \ [i, k].
We denote the closure of X ik by X¯
i
k. The closed-form expression for X¯
i
k is given by
X¯ ik = {y ∈ X | δyk ≤
δy[i, k] + 1− δ
k − i+ 1 ≤ δyk+1}.
Proposition 5.1: For all i ∈ N, for all k ∈ [i, n], the function ai is a contraction on
the set X¯ ik with contraction coefficient δ.
Proof: We first argue ai to be a contraction on the set X ik with contraction coefficient
δ. Take points y and y¯ in X ik. For each j ∈ [i, k] we have the inequalities
|aij(y)− aij(y¯)| =
∣∣∣∣δy([i, k]) + 1− δk − i+ 1 − δy¯([i, k]) + 1− δk − i+ 1
∣∣∣∣
=
δ
k − i+ 1 |y([i, k])− y¯([i, k])|
≤ δ
k − i+ 1
k∑
j=i
|yj − y¯j| ≤ δ
k − i+ 1
k∑
j=i
‖y − y¯‖ = δ‖y − y¯‖.
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For each j ∈ N \ [i, k] we have
|aij(y)− aij(y¯)| = δ|yj − y¯j| ≤ δ‖y − y¯‖.
We conclude that
‖ai(y)− ai(y¯)‖ ≤ δ‖y − y¯‖.
Now take points y and y¯ in X¯ ik. Let (yn)n∈N and (y¯n)n∈N be sequences in X
i
k converging
to y and y¯, respectively. Then, for all n ∈ N,
‖ai(yn)− ai(y¯n)‖ ≤ δ‖yn − y¯n‖,
and by taking the limit as n→∞, we have
‖ai(y)− ai(y¯)‖ ≤ δ‖y − y¯‖,
where we use the continuity of ai as derived in Proposition 4.4. Q.E.D.
The next step is to extend the result of Proposition 5.1, claiming that ai is a contrac-
tion on each set X¯ ik, to a result valid for the entire domain X. To derive this extension, we
exploit the fact that each X¯ ik is a polytope.
Theorem 5.2: For all i ∈ N, the function ai is a contraction with contraction coeffi-
cient δ.
Proof: It follows from Proposition 4.2 that the sets X ii , . . . , X
i
n partition the set X, so
the sets X¯ ii , . . . , X¯
i
n form a covering of X. Since all the equalities and inequalities defining
X¯ ik are linear, it follows that X¯
i
k is a polytope.
Take points y and y¯ in X and consider a straight line from y to y¯. Since all the sets X¯ ik
are polytopes, there exist y1, . . . , ym which are all on the line from y to y¯ and which are
such that y1 = y, ym = y¯, and for all ` ∈ [1,m − 1], y`, y`+1 ∈ X¯ ik for some k ∈ [i, n]. We
have that
‖ai(y)− ai(y¯)‖ ≤
m−1∑
`=1
‖ai(y`)− ai(y`+1)‖ ≤
m−1∑
`=1
δ‖y` − y`+1‖ = δ‖y − y¯‖,
where the second inequality follows from Proposition 5.1. Q.E.D.
Theorem 5.3: The function f is a contraction with contraction coefficient δ.
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a1(y) a2(y)
1− δ + δy1 δy1
δy2 1− δ + δy2
Table 1: The functions ai if k1 = 1 and k2 = 2.
Proof: For each y and y¯ we have the following inequalities
‖f(y)− f(y¯)‖ = ‖
n∑
i=1
1
n
(ai(y)− ai(y¯))‖ ≤
n∑
i=1
1
n
‖ai(y)− ai(y¯)‖ ≤ δ‖y − y¯‖,
where the last inequality follows from Theorem 5.2. Q.E.D.
The function f being a contraction implies that it has a unique fixed point. Since the
fixed points of f are in a one-one correspondence with tax equilibria, we find the following
corollary.
Corollary 5.4: There is a unique tax equilibrium.
6 Two Special Cases
This section calculates the tax equilibrium for the case where society consists of two income
groups and the case where it consists of three income groups. This analysis also gives some
first insights into the equilibrium choice of ki as well as the limit taxation scheme when
δ ↑ 1.
6.1 Two Players
In this subsection we assume n = 2. We compute the values of δ for which in a tax
equilibrium it holds that k1 = 1 and k2 = 2, where the latter equality follows by definition.
Table 1 shows the functions ai. At equilibrium it holds that a1(y) + a2(y) = 2y, which
can be rewritten as[
2− 2δ 0
0 2− 2δ
][
y1
y2
]
=
[
1− δ
1− δ
]
.
Solving it gives y1 = y2 = 1/2.
Moreover, ki should satisfy the inequalities presented in Proposition 4.1, so δy1 ≤
a11(y) < δy2 and δy2 ≤ a22(y). It holds that a11(y) = 1 − δ/2 > δ/2 = δy2, so there is no
value for δ for which k1 = 1 and k2 = 2.
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a1(y) a2(y)
1
2
δy1
1
2
1− δ + δy2
Table 2: The functions ai if k1 = 2 and k2 = 2.
p1 p2 y
1
2
δ
4−2δ
1
4−2δ
1
2
4−3δ
4−2δ
3−2δ
4−2δ
Table 3: The tax equilibrium proposals pi and tax equilibrium utility y if k1 = k2 = 2.
Since a tax equilibrium exists by Corollary 5.4, we have for all values of δ in equilibrium
k1 = 2 and k2 = 2. Table 2 depicts the corresponding functions a
i.
At equilibrium it holds that a1(y) + a2(y) = 2y, which can be rewritten as[
2− δ 0
0 2− δ
][
y1
y2
]
=
[
1
2
3
2
− δ
]
.
Solving it gives y1 = 1/(4− 2δ) and y2 = (3− 2δ)/(4− 2δ). It can be verified that k1 and
k2 satisfy the inequalities of Proposition 4.1 for all values of δ. Table 3 presents the tax
equilibrium proposals and the tax equilibrium utility.
We are interested in the limit of tax equilibrium proposals and tax equilibrium utility
when δ tends to 1 from below. Citizen 1 always proposes to split income equally, irrespective
of the value of δ. Citizen 2 does the same in the limit, since
lim
δ↑1
δ
4− 2δ =
1
2
and lim
δ↑1
4− 3δ
4− 2δ =
1
2
.
It then follows that in the limit, tax equilibrium utility as well as tax equilibrium after-tax
income is equal to 1/2 for both citizens.
6.2 Three Players
We now analyze the case where n = 3. We compute the values of δ for which in equilibrium
k1 = k2 = k3 = 3. We have the following system of 12 equations and 12 unknowns.
pi = ai(y), i ∈ [1, 3],
y =
∑
i∈[1,3]
1
n
pi,
which we can simplify as the following system in 3 equations and 3 unknowns:
a1(y) + a2(y) + a3(y) = 3y.
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p1 p2 p3 y
1
3
δ
3(3−2δ)
δ
3(3−2δ)
1
3(3−2δ)
1
3
9−7δ
6(3−2δ)
δ(15−11δ)
6(3−δ)(3−2δ)
15−11δ
6(3−δ)(3−2δ)
1
3
9−7δ
6(3−2δ)
25δ2−75δ+54
6(3−δ)(3−2δ)
12δ2−41δ+33
6(3−δ)(3−2δ)
Table 4: The tax equilibrium proposals pi and tax equilibrium utility y if k1 = k2 = k3 = 3.
p1 p2 p3 y
9−12δ+4δ2
18−15δ
3δ−2δ2
18−15δ
3−2δ2
18−15δ
3−2δ
18−15δ
9−12δ+4δ2
18−15δ
9−9δ+δ2
18−15δ
δ
3
1
3
9δ−8δ2
18−15δ
9−9δ+δ2
18−15δ
18−24δ+7δ2
18−15δ
9−8δ
18−15δ
Table 5: The tax equilibrium proposals pi and equilibrium utility y if k1 = 2, k2 = k3 = 3.
This system can be rewritten as 3− 2δ 0 00 3− 32δ −12δ
0 −1
2
δ 3− 3
2
δ

 y1y2
y3
 =

1
3
5
6
− 1
2
δ
11
6
− 3
2
δ
 ,
or equivalently 18− 12δ 0 00 18− 9δ −3δ
0 −3δ 18− 9δ

 y1y2
y3
 =
 25− 3δ
11− 9δ
 .
Solving the system we obtain the unique solution given by the last column of Table 4.
To check that the proposals in Table 4 constitute an equilibrium, one has to verify the
inequalities δy3 ≤ p13, δy3 ≤ p23, and δy3 ≤ p33. The most stringent inequality is δy3 ≤ p13. It
holds if and only if (δ − 3/4)(δ − 1)(δ − 2) ≤ 0, which is the case for δ ∈ [0, 3/4].
We now compute the values of δ for which in equilibrium k1 = 2, k2 = 3, and k3 = 3.
The system of equations 6y − 2a1(y)− 2a2(y)− 2a3(y) = 0 can be rewritten as 6− 5δ −δ 0−δ 6− 4δ −δ
0 −δ 6− 5δ

 y1y2
y3
 =
 1− δ2(1− δ)
3(1− δ)
 .
Table 5 presents the solution. To check that the proposals in Table 5 constitute an equi-
librium, one has to verify the inequalities δy2 ≤ p12 < δy3, δy3 ≤ p23, and δy13 ≤ p33. The
first three inequalities are respectively equivalent to (δ − 1)2 ≥ 0, (δ − 1)(4δ − 3) < 0,
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and δ − 1 ≤ 0, whereas the fourth inequality is satisfied for all values of δ. It follows that
δ ∈ (3/4, 1) gives rise to a tax equilibrium with k1 = 2, k2 = 3, and k3 = 3.
For the case with n = 3, the choice of ki depends on the value of δ. It is not true that
for δ close to 1, ki = 3 for all citizens i. Nevertheless, we verify next that in the limit all
players propose to share the aggregate income equally. Indeed,
limδ↑1(9−12δ+4δ
2
18−15δ ,
9−12δ+4δ2
18−15δ ,
9δ−8δ2
18−15δ ) = (
1
3
, 1
3
, 1
3
),
limδ↑1( 3δ−2δ
2
18−15δ ,
9−9δ+δ2
18−15δ ,
9−9δ+δ2
18−15δ ) = (
1
3
, 1
3
, 1
3
),
limδ↑1( 3−2δ
2
18−15δ ,
δ
3
, 18−24δ+7δ
2
18−15δ ) = (
1
3
, 1
3
, 1
3
).
As a consequence, the tax equilibrium expected utility as well as the tax equilibrium
expected after-tax income is equal to 1/3 for all citizens.
7 Procedurally Fair Taxation
In this section we make a first analysis of the limit of tax equilibria when δ ↑ 1 for an
arbitrary number of players. A first result is that all citizens make the same proposal in
the limit.
Theorem 7.1: Let (δm)m∈N be a sequence of continuation probabilities converging to
1 and, for m ∈ N, let pm be the tax equilibrium corresponding to continuation probability
δm. Then for any i, j ∈ N it holds that ‖pim − pjm‖ → 0.
Proof: Let ym be the tax equilibrium utility corresponding to pm. Since p
i
m ≥ δmym
and
∑n
k=1 ym,k = 1, we have that p
i
m,k ≤ δmym,k + (1− δm) for all k ∈ N. Therefore,
‖pim − pjm‖ = max
k∈N
|pim,k − pjm,k| ≤ 1− δm.
By taking the limit as m goes to infinity, the result follows. Q.E.D.
We consider after-tax incomes to be procedurally fair if they are the limit of after-tax
incomes proposed in the tax equilibrium when δ converges to one.
Definition 7.2: After-tax incomes x are procedurally fair if they are the limit of a
sequence (pim)m∈N, where p
i
m is the proposal of some citizen i ∈ N in the tax equilibrium
corresponding to δm and (δm)m∈N is a sequence of continuation probabilities converging to
one.
When studying procedurally fair after-tax incomes, the choice of the proposer i is
irrelevant by Theorem 7.1.
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We are interested in two questions. First, are procedurally fair after-tax incomes
uniquely determined? And if so, how are they characterized? The results in Section 6
show that when n = 2 or n = 3, procedurally fair after-tax incomes are uniquely deter-
mined and equal to the egalitarian solution. However, demonstrating such a result for
higher values of n requires techniques different from brute force calculations.
The literature on multi-lateral bargaining with unanimous agreement has obtained a
number of results on the convergence of non-cooperative equilibrium outcomes to the Nash
bargaining solution. In particular, such results have been demonstrated in Hart and Mas-
Colell (1996), Laruelle and Valenciano (2007), Miyakawa (2008), Kultti and Vartiainen
(2010), and Britz, Herings and Predtetchinski (2010) under increasingly weaker conditions.
Definition 7.3 The Nash product is the function ρ : X → R defined by
ρ(x) =
∏
i∈N
xi, x ∈ X.
The Nash bargaining solution is the unique maximizer of the function ρ on the set X.
The following result establishes that the Nash bargaining solution indeed corresponds
to the egalitarian income distribution. The vector e denotes the n-dimensional vector of
ones.
Theorem 7.4 The Nash bargaining solution is equal to (1/n)e.
Proof: The Nash bargaining solution, say x∗, allocates a positive amount of income
to citizen 1. Indeed, allocating zero income to citizen 1 leads to a Nash product of zero,
whereas the egalitarian solution belongs to X and leads to a strictly positive Nash product.
By definition of X, allocating a positive after-tax income to citizen 1 implies allocating a
positive after-tax income to all citizens.
It therefore holds that x∗ is a solution to the program
maximize
∑n
i=1
1
n
ln(xi)
subject to ∑n
i=1 xi = 1,
xi ≤ xi+1, i ∈ [1, n− 1].
The Lagrangian is given by
L =
n∑
i=1
1
n
ln(xi)− λ(
n∑
i=1
xi − 1)−
n−1∑
i=1
µi(xi − xi+1).
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A solution (λ∗, µ∗, x∗) to the optimization problem is therefore characterized by
1
nx∗i
− λ∗ − µ∗i + µ∗i−1 = 0, i ∈ [1, n],∑n
i=1 x
∗
i = 1,
x∗i ≤ x∗i+1, i ∈ [1, n− 1],
µ∗i (x
∗
i − x∗i+1) = 0, i ∈ [1, n− 1],
µ∗i ≥ 0, i ∈ [1, n− 1],
where µ∗0 and µ
∗
n are equal to 0 by definition. It is immediately verified that λ
∗ = 1, µ∗ = 0,
and x∗ = (1/n)e constitutes a solution. Q.E.D.
We have found that the Nash bargaining solution coincides with the egalitarian solution
for all values of n. Unfortunately, we cannot yet conclude that procedurally fair after-tax
incomes are equal to those of the egalitarian solution. The reason is that all the results on
convergence of multi-lateral bargaining with unanimous agreement to the Nash bargaining
solution assume that the set of feasible utilities has a differentiable Pareto frontier, a
requirement obviously not met by X.
Kultti and Vartiainen (2010) provide an example showing that without differentiability
the unique bargaining equilibrium may not converge to the Nash bargaining solution. Her-
ings and Predtetchinski (2011a) show that without differentiability the limit of bargaining
equilibria may not be unique. For instance, for a set X˜ given by the intersection of two
halfspaces,
X˜ = {x ∈ R3 | 2x1 + x2 + 3x3 ≤ 15} ∩ {x ∈ R3 | x1 + 2x2 + 3x3 ≤ 15},
Herings and Predtetchinski (2011a) show that bargaining equilibria converge to (3, 3, 2),
whereas the Nash bargaining solution is given by (10/3, 10/3, 5/3).
8 Convergence to the Nash Bargaining Solution
In this section we will argue that irrespective of the number of citizens, the only proce-
durally fair after-tax incomes correspond to the egalitarian solution, and therefore to the
Nash bargaining solution by Theorem 7.4. The first result of this section claims that tax
equilibrium utility is strictly increasing in pre-tax income.
Theorem 8.1: Let p ∈ XN be a tax equilibrium with utility y. Then it holds that
y1 < y2 < · · · < yn.
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Proof: Since y ∈ X, we have that y1 ≤ y2 ≤ · · · ≤ yn. Consider some i ∈ [1, n − 1].
We show that yi < yi+1. It holds that
pi+1i+1 =
δy([i+ 1, ki+1]) + 1− δ
ki+1 − i ≥
1− δ
ki+1 − i + δyi > δyi = p
i+1
i , (8.4)
where the weak inequality uses that the average of yi+1, . . . , yki+1 is at least yi+1 ≥ yi. Since
pj ∈ X for all j ∈ N, it holds that pji ≤ pji+1 for all j ∈ N. Moreover, by (??) it holds that
pi+1i < p
i+1
i+1. Since y =
∑
j∈N(1/n)p
j, we find that yi < yi+1. Q.E.D.
The next result claims that the thresholds ki are weakly increasing in i.
Theorem 8.2: Let p ∈ XN be a tax equilibrium with thresholds ki, i ∈ N. Then it
holds that k1 ≤ k2 ≤ · · · ≤ kn.
Proof: Consider some i ∈ [1, n− 1]. We show that ki ≤ ki+1.
If ki = i, then obviously ki < i+ 1 ≤ ki+1. Consider the case where ki > i. Then
aiki(y) =
δy([i,ki])+1−δ
ki−i+1 =
δy([i,ki])
ki−i+1 +
1−δ
ki−i+1
< δy([i+1,ki])
ki−i +
1−δ
ki−i =
δy([i+1,ki])+1−δ
ki−i = gi+1(ki),
where the inequality follows from the fact that yi < · · · < yki as shown in Theorem 8.1.
We have that δyki ≤ aiki(y) < gi+1(ki), and therefore ki+1 ≥ ki. Q.E.D.
We show next that any citizen i that does not have the highest income, proposes the
same income to citizen i + 1 as to himself. This property can be verified in Section 6 to
hold for n = 2 and n = 3.
Theorem 8.3: Let p ∈ XN be a tax equilibrium with thresholds ki, i ∈ N. Then, for
every i ∈ [1, n− 1], it holds that ki > i.
Proof: Tax equilibrium utility y should satisfy y =
∑
i∈N(1/n)a
i(y), with ai(y) given
by the expression in Proposition 4.1.
Suppose ki′ = i
′ for some i′ ∈ [1, n− 1]. For i > i′ it holds that∑
j∈[1,i′]
aij(y) =
∑
j∈[1,i′]
δyj.
For i ≤ i′ it holds that∑
j∈[1,i′]
aij(y) =
∑
j∈[1,i′]
δyj + (1− δ),
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where we use that ki′ = i
′ by our supposition and ki ≤ ki′ = i′ for i ≤ i′ by Theorem 8.2.
We have that∑
j∈[1,i′] yj =
∑
j∈[1,i′]
∑
i∈N
1
n
aij(y)
= 1
n
∑
i∈[1,i′]
∑
j∈[1,i′] a
i
j(y) +
1
n
∑
i∈[i′+1,n]
∑
j∈[1,i′] a
i
j(y)
= i
′
n
∑
j∈[1,i′] δyj +
i′
n
(1− δ) + n−i′
n
∑
j∈[1,i′] δyj
= δ
∑
j∈[1,i′] yj +
i′
n
(1− δ).
By rearranging this equality we find that
∑
j∈[1,i′] yj = i
′/n. Since y(N) = 1, we have that
the average of y1, . . . , yi′ weakly exceeds the average of yi′+1, . . . , yn, a contradiction to
Theorem 8.1. Q.E.D.
We show next that procedural fairness results in the egalitarian solution.
Theorem 8.4: The procedurally fair after-tax income is equal to (1/n)e.
Proof: Consider a sequence of continuation probabilities (δm)m∈N converging to 1
from below. Let pm be the tax equilibrium corresponding to continuation probability δm.
In view of Theorem 7.1 we can assume that the sequences (pim)m∈N converge to the same
limit p¯ for each i ∈ N . By Theorem 8.3 it holds that pim,i = pim,i+1 for every m and every
i ∈ [1, n− 1], so p¯i = p¯i+1 for every i ∈ [1, n− 1]. We can conclude that p¯1 = · · · = p¯n, and
p¯ = (1/n)e. Q.E.D.
9 Conclusion
We have addressed the consequences of procedurally fair income taxation in a very stylized
model where citizens are risk-neutral and have no disutility from labor. Incentive compat-
ibility dictates that after-tax income should be increasing in pre-tax income. There are no
distortive effects from income taxation in our setting. These simplifying assumptions enable
us to derive the stark result that procedural fairness results in complete redistribution.
These findings are in considerable contrast to those of Herings and Predtetchinski
(2011b), where the same model was analyzed under the restriction that taxation schemes
be linear. In that case the procedurally fair tax rate has been shown to be equal to the
percentage of citizens with below average income. Apparently, when policy makers have
the possibility to commit to linear taxation schemes, one would expect lower tax rates.
Without such commitment possibilities, below average income citizens can make use of the
flexibility of taxation schemes to increase the amount of redistribution in society.
The full flexibility of tax schedules studied here, up to the restrictions imposed by
incentive compatibility, allows for all kinds of taxation schemes, including progressive ones.
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The high-dimensionality of the resulting policy space has hindered analysis in the literature,
as Nash equilibria of majority voting games typically fail to exist. Roemer (1999) bypasses
this problem by weakening the Nash equilibrium concept. Here, it is the requirement of
unanimous agreement that enables us to deal with higher-dimensional policy spaces without
having to resort to mixed-strategy Nash equilibria. In the limit equilibrium, however, no use
of progressive taxation is made, but a linear taxation scheme involving full redistribution
results.
At least two of the simplifying assumptions we have made, call for a generalization.
On the one hand one would like to introduce risk-averse citizens, as risk aversion has
been recognized as an important driving force for outcomes of bargaining models. For
two-player bargaining models, it has been observed by Roth (1985) that increases in risk-
aversion undermine a player’s bargaining position. If we assume decreasing absolute risk
aversion, then the introduction of risk aversion should be expected to benefit high income
citizens, leading to less than full redistribution. Secondly, one would like to see the effect
of introducing disutility of labor. In this case, the usual incentive effects come into play,
make full redistribution undesirable for all citizens.
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